Abstract and keywords
Abstract (English):
Introduction. The view of criminal law as a means of regulating the behaviour of free willed people, which limits the sphere of criminal repression, has always been corrected by pragmatic considerations related to the need to influence the harmful behaviour of non-personal subjects. In modern society there is a need for it in connection with the assessment of socially significant harm, the source of which are legal entities and artificial intelligence systems, resulting in attempts to include them in the category of subjects of criminal law on the basis of the theoretically questionable concept of distinguishing between subjects of crime and subjects of criminal liability. Methods. The research was carried out by means of various methods, particularly general scientific methods of cognition, such as analysis, synthesis, generalisation, as well as private scientific - formal-legal, comparative-legal, method of interpreting legal norms, etc. Results. It is obvious that the issue of applying measures of influence in relation to non-personal subjects of law should be resolved with regard to and on the basis of philosophical theories of criminal law, the most attractive of which presents criminal law as a means of moral condemnation of acts that destroy the system of values designed to guarantee the stability and sustainability of society, and which does not allow the application of measures of criminal law influence against persons who are not capable of free moral choice. Keeping the current provisions on the possibility of recognising the subject of crime and the subject of criminal liability as exclusively a human being should be considered as a component of the system of maintaining the human aspect of criminal law and protecting the law from its dehumanisation.

Keywords:
perpetrator of a crime, subject of a crime, subject of criminal liability, liability of legal persons, liability of artificial intelligence systems
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