Introduction. We are currently witnessing a shift in the ideological trajectory of the institution of state coercion as a whole. This trend is characteristic not only of Russia but also of most countries worldwide. The reassessment of its developmental model, coupled with the emergence and dominance of new ideas, including those concerning the understanding of the anthropological characteristics of the human organism, has already led to the formation of a different approach to coercion as a phenomenon, and to its criminal law component in particular. Methods. This study is dedicated to identifying and justifying the presence of an ideological component within modern criminal law policy in Russia, as well as analysing the forms of its objectification in legislation and law enforcement practice. The complexity and multifaceted nature of the problem, which lies at the intersection of constitutional law, criminal law, and political science, necessitated the use of a wide range of general scientific and specialised methods of cognition. The methodological framework of the study is built upon the principles of comprehensiveness, systematicity, and objectivity, allowing the phenomenon of ideology in criminal law to be considered not as an abstract category, but as a tangible factor in the legislative process. Results. The ongoing transformation of coercive measures, changes in their legal regulation, legal status, and procedures (increasingly simplified) for their application, is in some respects unprecedented, overturning long-established and historically conditioned dogmas. The justification for such reforms is inherently ideological; it requires not so much meticulous detail but general direction, subordinate to a goalsetting framework, capable, in turn, of ensuring the results required by the state in combating crime. Consequently, the formation of an ideology even within the framework of criminal law action is seen as an objective necessity, despite its formal legal prohibition in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. This does not imply a violation of the prohibition established in the Basic Law, which would be entirely unacceptable. Today, there is a pressing need to form a coherent general concept regarding the directions and limits of influence and coercion applied to those who have committed socially dangerous behaviour. In the absence of such a central idea, this is scarcely achievable.